Abstract-With the prevalence of location-based services (LBSs) supported by advanced positioning technology, there is a dramatic increase in the transmission of high-precision personal geographical data. Malicious use of these sensitive data will threaten the privacy of LBS users. Although privacy research in LBSs has received wide attention, related works are mostly focused on some specific applications. Due to high diversity of LBSs, it is critical to build a universal model that is able to handle privacy protection for broader range of applications. In this paper, we propose a Computationally Recoverable Camouflage (CRC) model, where LBS users can preserve privacy by reporting camouflaged location information and are able to flexibly leverage between the service quality and the achieved privacy in different applications by adjusting the precision of the camouflage information. In particular, we propose a novel camouflage algorithm with formal privacy guarantee that considers both location context and social context, enabling LBS users to scalably expose camouflage information in terms of two dimensions. Furthermore, we apply the Scalable Ciphertext Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (SCP-ABE) algorithm to enforce fine-grained access control on the two-dimensional-scalable camouflage information. Through successful implementations on Android devices, we have demonstrated the computational efficiency of the proposed CRC model.
INTRODUCTION
P OSITIONING technology on mobile devices has been quite advanced in recent years. With a combination of cellular, Wi-Fi, and GPS, the current outdoor positioning techniques can quickly position a mobile user with a meter-level precision, while the indoor techniques can even achieve a centimeter-level precision [1] . The advancement of positioning technology has contributed to the boom of Location Based Services (LBSs), which utilize the locations sensed through mobile devices to provide entertainment and information for mobile users. LBS applications have formed a large portion of mobile applications nowadays. By reporting real-time locations, LBS users can actively request information from LBS servers. Such applications include navigation, searching points of interests (PoIs), checking public transportation, etc. Alternatively, LBS servers can also actively push information to LBS users by accessing their real-time locations. A representative application of this case is nearby friend notification, which alerts LBS users when their friends are nearby. By accumulating the historical location records, LBS servers can also provide users with personalized services such as friend recommendation, PoI recommendation, and personalized advertising.
The prevalence of LBSs has resulted in a dramatic increase of personal geo-data transmission between LBS servers and LBS users. In order to guarantee satisfactory service quality in LBSs, the transmitted geo-data usually embeds a high precision of the location information that is initially sensed by the positioning system. The leakage of such precise location information would cause serious privacy issues for LBS users. On the one hand, the leakage of real-time location may result in LBS users being tracked by malicious people. On the other hand, storing the personal precise geo-data in untrusted servers without appropriate data management is also a potential privacy threaten. For example, by accessing the historical geo-data, adversaries would be able to summarize highly sensitive location information about a LBS user such as the home location or the work location [2] . Apart from the location context, the extremely sensitive social context, such as the user interest and daily routines, might also be derived and endangered.
Therefore, it is imperative to develop privacy-aware LBSs, where LBS users are able to preserve their privacy while enjoying the services.
Privacy-Aware LBSs: State-of-the-Art
In general, privacy-aware LBSs aim at protecting the precise location information of LBS users by only revealing their coarse location information to others. We classify the related schemes from the literature into two categories, i.e. query privacy protection and location privacy protection, as indicated in Fig. 1 . Specifically, query privacy protection prevents the mapping from a request to a LBS user by anonymizing the identity of the real user. By contrast, location privacy protection focuses on determining the reported precision of the location information for each real location. Query Privacy Protection: One popular strategy depending on anonymization to protect query privacy is k-anonymity [3] . In the context of LBS, k-anonymity protects the identities of the LBS users by restricting that a user is only allowed to send requests from a region, i.e. the camouflage region, when at least k − 1 other users of the service are present within that region [4] , [5] , [6] . This implies that the LBS user can be located in the camouflage region but is indistinguishable from at least k − 1 other users in the view of an attacker. The LBS server then provides services based on the location information reflected by the camouflage region. Since the camouflage region used in k-anonymity is usually small, the service quality will not be degraded significantly. However, k-anonymity schemes require that all LBS users continuously report the exact locations to a fully trusted third party (TTP) which performs the anonymization. This may result in serious privacy issues when the TTP is compromised [7] , [8] .
In [9] , it is proposed that additional encryption on LBS queries can be adopted to relieve the trust dependence on TTP, and thus only a semi-TTP is required for anonymization. Furthermore, some schemes [10] , [11] , [12] adopt homomorphic encryption (HE), which allows delegating the ability to process data without giving away access to it. In this way, LBS servers are able to provide services based on the ciphered location information. Although these schemes do not depend on a TTP, the LBS server is required to perform heavy computations in order to retrieve the information based on encrypted geo-data, resulting in limited usability.
Location Privacy Protection:
A representative solution of location privacy protection is obfuscation, which generates a camouflage region for a LBS user by deliberately degrading the precision of the individual's real location [13] , [14] , i.e., reporting coarser location information. For example, if one user is located in the Empire State Building, then from the point of view of the attacker, the user could be anywhere within a certain radius from the Empire State Building. Some secure mobile OSs like iOS 8 provide similar privacy policy that enables LBS users to report coarser location information to LBS servers, and hence LBS users are able to preserve their privacy in a designated range. Although this simple strategy may alleviate the privacy issues, it is non-trivial for LBS users to configure the exact ranges on various applications in different places. In [15] , a concept of relevance is defined for selecting the size of the camouflage area, and balancing the trade-off between the service quality and the achieved privacy. In [16] , it is proposed to set up an anonymous server and utilize the entropy to decide the range of the camouflage area c. Suppose N = m i=1 n i represents the total number of footprints from the LBS users in c. The entropy of c is computed
If the value of E(c) is lower than a threshold, the LBS user needs to enlarge c until E(c) reaches that threshold.
HE technique is also applied in some works for location privacy protection in some specific applications. For instance, in [17] , a LBS user is able to request the distance from other users, without disclosing his or her own location information to others.
Another method to protect location privacy is to generate k − 1 dummy points with the same precision as the positioned real location, and to send k queries to the LBS server [18] . In this way, the LBS server cannot distinguish the true location of the LBS user. One advantage of such a scheme compared to entropy-based obfuscation is that LBS users can exactly recover their own services in the returned results from the LBS server. However, as analyzed in [19] , such a strategy cannot guarantee the privacy of a user in terms of position analyzing. As a privacy enhanced scheme, it is proposed in [20] to report three fake points to cover the service range of one real point. In this way, an attacker can only locate the user in a triangle. Higher-degree privacy can be achieved by further increasing the number of possible triangles using the same idea of k − 1 dummy points. Nonetheless, such kind of strategies would cause too much communication bandwidth waste for sending the dummy requests. It may also cause confusion in some applications. For instance, in nearby friend notification, the dummy points will lead to too many wrong alerts.
Instead of reporting multiple locations to LBS servers, it is proposed in [21] to report one point within a camouflage area to replace the real location to LBS servers. The generation of the reported point (camouflaged point) is conducted by geo-indistinguishability, which is derived from differential privacy theory [22] . The privacy level provided by the camouflaged point depends on the value of r, where is the privacy parameter in differential privacy theory, and r is the radius of the camouflage area. By using the PoI retrieval service as an example, it is addressed in [21] that the desired result corresponding to the real location can be recovered by simple mathematical operations. However, this recovery process is not generic and we will demonstrate in Section 3 that it is not straightforward to apply it in all kinds of applications. Additionally, we will show that the current strategy of generating the camouflaged point cannot always guarantee the desired privacy in practical use. Discussion: Our main objective in this paper is to propose a universal privacy-aware LBS model, which protects location privacy of the LBS users while enables the users to enjoy a wide variety of LBS applications. However, the state-of-art schemes discussed above can only be applied in very limited number of LBS applications. For example, schemes in [4] , [5] , [6] are designed for k nearest neighbors search. Similarly, [17] is designed for friends' location request, and [21] is mostly applied in surrounding PoIs search.
More specifically, since query privacy protection prevents the mapping of a LBS request to the LBS user, it also prevents LBS servers from storing the historical records of LBS users. This would immediately disable the major functionality of some applications. Besides, due to the anonymization on user identities, this strategy is not applicable in applications that need identity information. Therefore, the services that LBS servers can provide will be very limited if query privacy protection is adopted. On the other hand, the major challenge of location privacy protection is addressing the degradation on service quality [23] . Unfortunately, existing schemes fail to provide a general framework to overcome this challenge. Unacceptable service quality, high communication cost, and limited application scenarios are among the major problems. More importantly, as location-based social networks (LBSNs) is gaining increasing popularity, there emerge some applications such as nearby friend discovery where a single service request causes privacy issues for multiple users. If we simply degrade the location precision for each user as in traditional LBS applications, it would be impossible to guarantee the satisfactory service quality [24] .
To achieve the goal of building a universal privacyaware LBS model, we adopt the location privacy protection method, which has less limitation on the types of applications, and then address its challenge of balancing privacy and service quality.
Contributions of the Paper
In this paper, we propose a Computationally Recoverable Camouflage (CRC) LBS model, where LBS users preserve their privacy by reporting camouflaged locations instead of real locations to request services from LBS servers, and are able to recover the desired results in various kinds of LBS applications by flexibly leveraging between service quality and the achieved privacy.
In particular, we propose a novel camouflage algorithm with formal privacy guarantee, where camouflaged points are generated by exploring both location context and social context. More specifically, we refer location context as the camouflage range, and refer social context as the type of points of interest (POIs). By adjusting the camouflage range and the description of the POI type, a LBS user can expose camouflage information with different precisions in different applications in order to achieve the desired privacy guarantee and service quality. In addition, we propose to apply and adapt our proposed Scalable Ciphertext Policy AttributeBased Encryption (SCP-ABE) algorithm [25] into the CRC model to automatically manage the exposure of the camouflage information in a fine-grained manner.
Using the nearby friend notification application as an example, we show how to initiate a service and to recover the desired results in the proposed CRC model. In particular, we consider the scenario where only one user is camouflaging, as well as the scenario where all users involved in the service are camouflaging. The representative scenarios can be easily extended to many other LBS applications.
We conclude our contributions as below:
• We build a universal model for privacy-aware LBSs that is able to meet the privacy requirements of LBS users in various LBS applications.
• We propose a novel camouflage algorithm with formal privacy guarantee that considers both location context and social context, letting LBS users flexibly leverage between the service quality and the achieved privacy in different LBS applications.
• We propose a secure access control mechanism to manage the exposure of the camouflage information in a two-dimensional scalable manner.
CRC MODEL: SYSTEM OVERVIEW

Camouflage Information Assumption
As in [21] , we assume that the possible locations of any LBS users is a set X of points of interest (POIs). In the CRC model, camouflage is achieved by using an observing set of POIs, which is a subset of X , to replace the POI that the user actually locates at. As in practice, we further assume that X is publicly accessible, and hence is the basic location information that an adversary has about any LBS users. However, the access to an observing set needs additional camouflage information of the corresponding LBS user.
In this research, we use two types of contexts to represent camouflage information, i.e., location context and social context. Considering that the transmission of locations of multiple points consumes too much bandwidth, we instead use the geo-range to determine the observing set. In particular, we define the geo-range by a camouflaged point and a camouflage range. Given a LBS user at a specific POI, the user generates a camouflaged point C and designates a camouflage range R. Then the resulted observing set will be S ⊂ X that contains all POIs located within R centered at C. Specifically, C is generated utilizing the surrounding POIs. Detailed process will be introduced in Section 3.
Furthermore, a POI is also associated with social context such as the place type. On the one hand, such social context maybe critical for some personalized LBS services. For example, by knowing that a LBS user often visits a restaurant, the LBS server can promote To sum up, the camouflaged location information in the CRC model is a tuple represented by (C, R, T ). Each possible tuple (C i , R i , T i ) will represent an observing set S i ⊆ S. In the example shown in Fig. 2 , the camouflage
result in the observing set S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , S 4 , respectively.
Trust Model
The first trust issue exists between LBS users and LBS servers. In our CRC model, we assume that a LBS server is trusted to provide correct and complete information for LBS users based on the reported location or camouflage information, and is trusted to conform to the mechanisms in the CRC model. However, the LBS server is not trusted to keep the location information of LBS users private from other parties. In other words, a LBS server may actively sell the location information to others, or may passively leak the location information to adversaries due to improper data management. Furthermore, trust issues are also involved among LBS users. In some LBS applications, such as nearby people searching or nearby friend notification, a LBS user is able to request the location information of other users from LBS servers. Therefore, it is possible that some malicious users may manipulate such applications to access location information of others.
In order to preserve privacy, we assume a LBS user uses the camouflage information instead of the real location in LBSs. In other words, the originally positioned location of the user may not be reported to LBS servers nor be accessible for other LBS users.
Additionally, we assume that LBS users may enjoy different trust relationships with other LBS users or with the LBS server in different applications. For example, a LBS user may want to share a relative precise location with users in the same city, but a relative coarse location with other non-local users. The user may also be glad to share the social context that he is located at some bar with his friends, but not with his workmates. For another example, when a LBS user requests the nearest highly rated restaurants, he may expose a relatively precise location to the LBS server. However, when he is receiving local breaking news, he only needs to expose a coarse location to the LBS server. Therefore, the CRC model allows LBS users to enjoy scalable privacy levels to satisfy the requirements in different scenarios.
In particular, the scalability of privacy levels is achieved by adjusting the camouflage range and the social context of the observing set in the camouflage tuple. A smaller camouflage range and a more precise social context will result in a smaller observing set, corresponding to a lower privacy level, and vise versa for a larger range and a less precise social context. In the example shown in Fig. 2 , the LBS user Alice sets four privacy levels by choosing two camouflage ranges, i.e. R 
The four tuples expose different location information. The access to these tuples are controlled by the proposed SCP-ABE algorithm. Details are discussed in Section 4.
Message Flow Mechanism
To begin with, each user in the CRC model is required to determine his or her privacy level with respect to the LBS server, and to create the corresponding camouflage tuple (C, R, T ) and report it to the server. If a LBS user allows other LBS users to access his or her location information, the individual also needs to determine the privacy levels with respect to different LBS users described by attributes, and to create the corresponding tuples. Details of the generation of multiple camouflage tuples will be discussed in Section 4. These tuples are encrypted before being reported to the LBS server. Only the users with designated attributes would be able to decrypt the corresponding tuple. Apart from the camouflage tuple, a user also needs to designate the serving area r, where the user wants to be served. The LBS server then provides service based on r and (C, R, T ).
In the case shown in Fig. 2 , Alice chooses to expose (A , R 2 A , T 1 ) to the LBS server. We assume that Alice has the desired serving area within the range of r A centered at A, where she is learning about the reviews of popular restaurants. From the point of view of the server, Alice could be at any POI associated with social context T 1 and within R 2 A +r A centered at A . In order to fully cover Alice's desired serving area, the LBS server enlarges the serving area centered at A with the range of R A , which should be no less than R 2 A + r A . Since the enlarged serving area results in redundancy, Alice needs to remove those redundancies out of her desired area upon receiving the response.
In the case that only the user who is requesting the LBS service is camouflaging, the redundancy can be removed through simple calculation on the locations of the returned places or other LBS users. However, such naive method is not applicable when other user(s) involved in the LBS service is (are) camouflaging. For example, if Bob sent a nearby friend notification request and received the response from the server, he may not know whether or not Alice should be removed from the response since Alice is camouflaging. In this case, Bob needs to further request the camouflage tuple of Alice. The more precise the geo-information the tuple reflects, the more effective is the redundancy removal.
In general, a larger camouflage range with respect to the LBS server brings more redundancies in the responded results, which may lead to heavier computation cost and lower service quality. Furthermore, the precision of a user's camouflage tuple may also impact the service quality. In practice, a LBS user needs to leverage among these factors to achieve a satisfactory experience.
THE CAMOUFLAGE ALGORITHM
The camouflage algorithm generates the camouflage tuple (C, R, T ) with formal privacy guarantee. Specifically, we propose the algorithm based on differential privacy [22] . In this section, we first introduce the preliminary of the algorithm, i.e. differential privacy. Then we proceed to analyze a typical differential privacy based camouflage algorithm and show its vulnerability. Finally we present the proposed camouflage algorithm.
Differential Privacy
A mechanism K with -differential privacy [22] could guarantee that the outputs of the data set for one request will not become more or less likely, even if the participant removes his or her data from the data set.
This addresses the concern that any participant might have leaked his or her personal information. Specifically, a randomized function K gives -differential privacy if for all data sets D 1 and D 2 differing on at most one element, and all S ⊆ Range(K), we have
(1)
Analysis On A Typical Camouflage Algorithm
Based on the differential privacy theory, Miguel Andres et al. [21] defined geo-indistinguishability to provide formal privacy guarantee for LBS users, and proposed a mechanism to generate camouflaged points satisfying geo-indistinguishability. In this section, we introduce the concept of geo-indistinguishability and the camouflage algorithm. Then we carry out the vulnerability analysis on the scheme.
Geo-indistinguishability
Let X be the set containing the possible locations of the user Alice, which also includes her real location A. Let Z be the set of possible camouflaged points (arbitrary geolocations), and S ⊆ Z be all the observations. Suppose Alice needs to preserve her privacy within a radius r and S will be the set of possible reported points in this area. If Alice generates a camouflaged point O ∈ S with a probability similar as that of the other user Bob at an arbitrary location B within r, then O reveals little information about whether Alice's real location is A or B.
Based on such an assumption, -geo-indistinguishability is defined as for all observations O ∈ S:
Correspondingly, the user enjoys r-privacy within r.
Generation of Camouflaged Points
Given a real location x 0 ∈ R 2 , in order to generate a camouflaged point x ∈ R 2 satisfying -geoindistinguishability, the function planar laplacian centered in x 0 is defined in (3), where 2 /2π is a normalization factor, and d x0 x is the distance between x 0 and x.
Now let us consider the example indicated in Fig. 3 , where A is the real location of the user who expects rprivacy within r, and B is an arbitrary point in X within this area. Note that the distance between A and B, i.e. d B A , will be no more than r. Suppose the reported location is A , which is d Fig. 3 . Different geo-indistinguishabilities provided by two camouflaged points According to (2) , this implies that the user who is located at A enjoys r-privacy within r. In practice, the point is generated by first selecting the direction θ uniformly in [0, 2π), then selecting z uniformly in [0,1) and finally setting the distance
The parameters (d, θ) are mapped to the closest point on the grid of discrete cartesian coordinates within r. Please refer more details in [21] .
Vulnerability Analysis
For a real location A and a privacy range r, the above scheme could provide r −privacy for the user by generating A with the distance to A less than r. However, we show that the scheme is not generic as it cannot satisfy various levels of privacy demands and may even fail to protect user privacy in some cases.
According to the camouflage mechanism, all of the members in the observing set S should be within r centered at the real location A. Based on this fact, let us consider the two cases shown in Fig. 3 , where the user locating at A intends to enjoy r−privacy within r, and generates a camouflaged point A with two different locations. To simplify the problem, we assume A and B are the only two points in the observing set S.
Suppose there is an attacker who has prior knowledge of the user that the probability of the user located at A is P (A), while the probability of the user located at B is P (B). Then the probability of a successful attack P (success) is equal to P (A). In order to build a relationship between the distinguishability and P (success), we define the attacking success factor Suc as the ratio between the probability of successfully guessing the real location and the probability of guessing the other location. In this example, without any other knowledge, Suc is expressed as
It is noted that a higher value of Suc indicates a higher probability of guessing A. After having observed A , Suc turns to be the following
This indicates the contribution of the reported point to the attacker is P (A |A)/P (A |B). We define it as distinguishability. According to (2) , in the left case where d , the distinguishability is equal to e ·0 = 1, meaning that the reported point does not contribute to the success factor at all. In some cases, the distinguishability of the two points, such as workplace and home, could be extremely important for a user's privacy [2] . Therefore, the provision of the upper bound e r distinguishability for users may not be sufficient to satisfy user's privacy requirement.
Additionally, through the knowledge that the camouflage point A is generated within r centered at A, i.e. d A A ≤ r, the attacker can directly exclude B in the left case of Fig. 3, since d A B = 2r > r. This vulnerability results from the assumption that the observation set is within r centered at A. However, the expected observation set is not the points exposed to the attacker. As shown in Fig.4 , when a reported point A is exposed to an attacker, the attacker will guess the real location of the user within r centered at A . In other words, a different camouflaged point would be treated as in a different observing set by the attacker. To prevent such an attack in the right case, the camouflaged point A should be within r for both A and B.
The Proposed Camouflage Algorithm
We propose a novel camouflage algorithm on the basis of differential privacy but address the vulnerabilities of the above scheme through two considerations. First, the camouflaged point not only provides an upper bound of distinguishability with other points in the observing set and the real location, but also maximizes the bound. Second, the observation set used in our algorithm is centered at the camouflaged point. Furthermore, the observation set in our scheme is determined by two factors, i.e., camouflage range and social context, providing more flexibilities for LBS users to select various privacy guarantees in different LBS applications.
Objective Function
To begin with, by representing the distinguishability between A and B as dis(A, B), we present the success factor in (6) as following
We can see that the probability of successful attack is enhanced by a multiplicative factor of dis(A, B) after observing the reported point. In other words, a larger distinguishability contributes more to the attack, while a smaller distinguishability guarantees a higher privacy of the user. Therefore, our scheme needs to decrease dis (A, B) .
Then we consider a more general condition where a LBS user selects an observing set S that contains multiple points within a range. After observing the camouflaged point, the probability of a successful attack is
In order to enhance user privacy, we need to minimize P (success), which is equal to maximizing the inverse. Therefore, we have the following objective.
By assuming that all of the locations in S have the same prior probability from the view of the attacker, we get
We hence obtain the objective function I as follows.
Furthermore, given a selected observing set, it might be more possible for the user to be located at some locations. In other words, the prior probabilities may be different. In this case, the value of
is not consistent for each i as in the assumption of objection function I.
By treating the value of P (i) as a weight parameter w i , and i∈S w i = 1, the objective shown in (9) can be presented in the following manner.
Therefore, we can obtain the objective function II as
The objective function can be comprehended in such a way that a LBS user may prefer a relatively higher indistinguishability among some places. For example, a LBS user who often goes back and force between workplace and home may care more about the distinguishability between his workplace and his house, rather than whether the attacker can tell if he is working or drinking coffee in the restaurant near his workplace. To satisfy such privacy requirement, we set different weights on the various kind of distinguishabilities.
Camouflaged Point Generation
Since the first objective function can be treated as a special case of second objective function where w i = 1, ∀i ∈ S, we here refer the objective function as the second one. According to the objective function, the camouflaged point is generated based on the information of the observing set. However, since the observing set is centered at the camouflaged point, the observing set cannot be determined before the camouflaged point is generated.
To solve this problem, we first choose a point within the camouflage range R centered at the real user location as the candidate of the target camouflaged point. Then we determine the observing set centered at this candidate, and compute the value of i∈S w i ·dis(A, i)
for each point in observing set. The candidate with the maximal value of i∈S w i · dis(A, i) −1 will be selected as the target camouflaged point.
A naive implementation mechanism would be going through each candidate within R centered at the real user location. However, this will result in heavy computation cost, which may not be feasible on mobile devices. More importantly, if we examine each possible candidate and obtain the optimal one as the camouflaged point, the result will be deterministic instead of probabilistic, making the algorithm fail to satisfy geo-indistinguishability.
Therefore, we proposed to first generate n candidates within R as in Section 3.2. More specifically, we randomly choose θ 1 , θ 2 , ..., θ n uniformly from [0, 2π), and z 1 , z 2 , ..., z n uniformly from [0,1). Then we set the distance from the real user location as
is then mapped to the closest point A i on the grid of discrete cartesian coordinates within R. The corresponding observing set S i (i = 1, 2, ..., n) can be determined centered with the mapped location A i . Furthermore, we assign the weight by considering the distance to the candidate and the social context. For example, we assign a higher weight if the point is nearer to the candidate or has a more similar social context to the real location. After assigning the weights for the points in the observing set, we compute the value of the objective function. The candidate with the highest value is outputed as the camouflaged point.
The algorithm is summarized as in Algorithm 1.
Discussion
The 1, 2, . .., n) ; Map (d j , θ j ) to the closest point A j = (Lat A j , Lng A j ) on the grid of discrete cartesian coordinates within R; M AX = 0; for Each candidate A j do Determine observing set S j based on (A j , R, T ); Assign weights (w 1 , w 2 , ...w |Sj | ) on all points in S j based on the input weight assignment policy, s.t.
k=|Sj | k=1
such as google places. One possible issue is that a geolocation is needed to retrieve the surrounding POIs while the real geo-location of the LBS user is protected in our model. In practice, this issue can be easily solved given the fact that the retrieval of basic information of POIs is not sensitive to the precision of geo-locations. Some APIs even support the retrieval of POI information with a designated area on the map. Therefore, we can simply degrade the precision of the real positioned location. The completeness of the observing sets can be achieved either by sending multiple requests as the method applied in [18] , or by designating a large enough area on the map. Moreover, since we only need the social context and geoinformation of the POIs, the communication cost of this step will be totally acceptable.
2D SCALABLE PRIVACY GUARANTEE
To enable LBS users to flexibly leverage between the service quality and the achieved privacy in different applications, the proposed CRC model provides twodimensional-scalable privacy guarantee. For a LBS user, he or she can enjoy different privacy guarantees with respect to the LBS server by simply adjusting the camouflage range and the social context exposed to the LBS server. However, the privacy guarantee with respect to other LBS users cannot be achieved in the same way. In many LBS applications such as nearby friend discovery, a LBS user does not know who is going to access his or her location information. Therefore, an automatic management on the exposure of location information to other LBS users is required. In the proposed CRC model, we solve this issue by applying the SCP-ABE algorithm proposed in our previous work [25] , which is able to enforce access control on the camouflage information with two-dimension scalability. In this section, we first give a brief introduction of the proposed SCP-ABE algorithm. Then we proceed to describe the integration of the algorithm into the CRC model to achieve 2D scalable privacy guarantee.
SCP-ABE
The SCP-ABE algorithm is proposed to perform access control on multi-dimension scalable data. Fig. 5 shows an example of 2-by-2 scalable data structure, where there are four messages k 11 , k 12 , k 21 , and k 22 . The message located at the lowest level (k 11 ) alone reveals the basic information. The revealed information is enriched with the additional messages located at higher level (k 12 , k 21 , and k 22 ). The access to each message is managed under a specific policy determined by attributes, i.e., P 11 , P 12 , P 21 , and P 22 . The access policy of a higher level message (e.g., k 12 ) is more restricted (contains more attributes) than that of a lower level message (e.g., k 11 ). Therefore, there are totally four access privileges under the 2-by-2 scalable data structure, i.e, k 11 accessible, k 11 and k 12 accessible, k 11 and k 21 accessible, and all accessible.
The SCP-ABE algorithm is composed of six subalgorithms including system setup, access tree construction, encryption, decryption, user key generation, and delegation. In particular, the system setup algorithm generates public key and master key used in the system. The access tree construction algorithm constructs the scalable access tree according to the attribute-based access policies. The encryption algorithm then encrypts the data under the access tree. An individual needs to perform the decryption algorithm to access the data, by using the user secret keys created by the user key generation algorithm. The user secret keys are assigned by the attribute authority (AA) [26] according to the attributes. The decryption of a message succeeds only if the decrypter's attributes satisfy the corresponding part of the access tree. The delegation algorithm supports the generation of new user secret keys based on one user secret key. The newly generated keys are associated with less attributes than the original key. Details of the SCP-ABE algorithm can be referred in [25] .
SCP-ABE Based Scalable Privacy Guarantee
2D Scalable Camouflage Information Creation
When integrating the SCP-ABE algorithm with the CRC model, we first consider the camouflage tuple as the Suppose that a LBS user intends to set four levels of privacy guarantees by selecting two different camouflage ranges
A ) and two different descriptions on social contexts T 1 , T 2 (T 1 < T 2 ). One naive method is to input every combination of the camouflage range and the social context to the camouflage algorithm, and to generate four camouflaged points respectively. However, the problem of such a method is that two different tuples may reveal more location information than they suppose to. For example, by obtaining the tuple (
, an individual would know the user is located within R 1 A centered at A 1 and associated with social context T 1 . However, the individual can further exclude those points satisfying the above conditions but without R 1 A centered at A 2 . Therefore, the LBS user would not be able to enjoy the desired privacy guarantees.
To avoid such a problem, we configure all the tuples with the same camouflaged point. In the above example, we can set the input camouflage range as R One possible issue of such a data structure is that A is only the optimal camouflaged point 1 for the tuple (A , R 
Attribute Authorization
As the SCP-ABE algorithm determines access policies based on attributes, we need to address the attribute authorization problem in the CRC model. In SCP-ABE, there is an AA authorizing the attributes of users, and assigning the users with secret keys for access. The AA needs to be guaranteed reachable and trusted by the users. Therefore, the LBS users cannot run their own AAs, since they may not be reachable by other users who are also possible to request their location information. Besides, the LBS server cannot play the role of AA either. Otherwise, it would be able to access the most precise location information provided by LBS users, which violates the CRC trust model. Therefore, we need to choose a TTP to play the role of AA.
Since the LBS-related attributes such as the friendship in the system and the relative location between two users can only be authorized by the LBS server, the TTP will have to cooperate with the LBS server to authorize such attributes. Additionally, the essential location-related attributes of an access policy, such as the city that a user locates and the relative distance between two users, change frequently due to the movement of LBS users. Therefore, the cooperation between the LBS server and the TTP may result in heavy communication cost in the case that these attributes change frequently and further result in frequent change of user access privileges.
To solve this issue, we divide the attributes into two sets. One set is LBS-related, while the other is LBSunrelated. We let the LBS server be authorized by the AA with all the attributes in the LBS-related attribute set. By running the delegation algorithm, we allow the LBS server to delegate LBS users the user secret keys according to their LBS-related attributes. Then we arrange the access tree, guaranteeing that the LBS server does not have any access privilege on the user location information as long as it does not own the attributes in the LBS-unrelated attribute set. For example, we can set the redundant attributes a i (i = 1, 2, ..., M + N − 2), and a ij (i = 2, ..., M |j = 1; j = 2, ..., N |i = 1) in the SCP-ABE algorithm [25] as the LBS-unrelated attributes. Without assigning these attributes to the LBS server, the LBS server will not able to decrypt the key seed and recover any access keys although it owns all other attributes.
1. Due to the simplified implementation of the camouflage algorithm, A is actually just the sub-optimal camouflaged point.
Encryption-Based 2D Scalable Access Control
When the 2D scalable camouflage information has been created and the scalable access tree has been constructed, the 2D scalable access control can be performed by encrypting the camouflage information under the scalable access tree using the SCP-ABE encryption algorithm. As the size of data could be large, we first encrypt the data under lightweight symmetric encryption algorithm, such as AES. The SCP-ABE encryption algorithm therefore usually encrypts the access keys. In the example shown in Fig. 6 , we can treat k 
CASE STUDY
In this section, we conduct a LBS case study to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed CRC model from two aspects, i.e. service feasiblity and privacy guarantee. In particular, the case study is based on the nearby friend notification application where a user Bob desires to receive the alert when his friend Alice is nearby. We will first describe the complete nearby friend notification process under the CRC model, which contains five parts, i.e., initialization, location report, service request, service response, and information recovery. Then we analyze the achieved service quality. Last, we discuss the potential privacy threatens, and demonstrate how to address them under the CRC model.
Service Process Under The CRC Model
Initialization Both Alice and Bob run the following initialization steps:
• Decide the expected privacy guarantees and the corresponding access keys organized in a 2D key management structure. Determine the access policy for each access key in the key management structure by selecting both the LBS-related attribute set and the LBS-unrelated attribute set.
• Run the SCP-ABE setup algorithm to create the public keys and the master keys.
• Run the SCP-ABE access tree construction algorithm to build the access tree.
• Cooperate with the AA, run the SCP-ABE user key generation algorithm to create user keys for all attributes in the LBS-unrelated attribute set (S (13), and will be waiting for the request to authorize the LBS-unrelated attributes and to assign the corresponding user keys for other LBS users.
Location Report
In the case of no camouflage requirement, Alice and Bob simply report their real location to the LBS server. On the other hand, if they choose to camouflage, the following operations are performed.
• Alice and Bob run the camouflage algorithm to generate the camouflage points (A for Alice and B for Bob). The camouflage tuples are then created.
• Alice and Bob run the SCP-ABE encryption algorithm as well as the symmetric encryption algorithm (e.g. AES algorithm) to encrypt the camouflage tuples, and send the ciphertext to the server.
• The LBS server applies for SCP-ABE user keys corresponding to all of the LBS-related attributes from the AA. It is also prepared to run the SCP-ABE delegation algorithm to authorize the SCP-ABE user keys to Alice, Bob, and other LBS users.
• Alice and Bob designate the desired serving range r A (for Alice) and r B (for Bob), select a privacy guarantee and the corresponding tuple to be exposed to the LBS server, and send the information to the server. Note that they may expose the real location (A for Alice, B for Bob) to the server if they only concern the privacy issues with other LBS users. When Alice or Bob moves to a new place, she or he needs to generate new camouflaged tuples, re-encrypts them and sends them to the LBS server. The LBS server then refreshes the information stored in its memory.
Service Request And Response
Suppose that Bob desires to receive an alert when Alice steps into the range with distance no more than r B from his location. He sends the nearby friend notification request to the LBS server.
Upon receiving the request, the LBS server needs to keep calculating the distance between Alice and Bob based on their reported locations, and alert Bob whenever Alice steps into the serving range. To guarantee that there is no missed alert, the LBS server has to enlarge the serving range if either Bob or Alice is camouflaging.
For ease of presentation, we assume that Alice has created four tuples (A , R to the server, the server will instead notify Bob when Alice steps into the area with the distance no more than R 2 A + r B + R 1 B to Bob. Both conditions ensure no missed alerts. However, they may result in wrong alerts and the second condition has a higher probability of wrong alerts as its serving range is R 1 B larger.
Information Recovery
In order to identify the wrong alerts, Bob needs to access Alice's camouflage tuple(s). The ciphertext of Alice's camouflage tuples can be requested from the LBS server. It has the following format, where T A is Alice's access tree, k Fig. 7 . Nearby friend alerts in various scenarios
With the SCP-ABE user key, Bob runs the SCP-ABE decryption algorithm. Suppose the tuple that Bob obtains is (A , R 2 A , T 2 ). Then Bob can obtain e(g, g)
rp R 11 (0) and e(g, g)
rs . By further using C 11 andD in SK A B , k A 11 can be recovered according to (20) . Details of decryption process can be referred in [25] . Bob will eventually decrypt the tuple (A , R 2 A , T 2 ), which will facilitate the identification between the correct alerts and wrong ones.
Note that due to the movement, the LBS-related attributes of Bob may change across time. In order to satisfy Alice's privacy guarantee, each time when Bob requests Alice's access keys, the LBS server should check Bob's attributes and reassign SK is not needed to be updated unless Alice has performed key updates or key revocation.
Service Quality Analysis
The camouflage technique adopted by the CRC model may result in some wrong alerts. Fig. 7 shows four examples indicating the nearby friend alerts sent by the server in four different scenarios.
In (a) and (b) where only Alice is camouflaging, the LBS server does not notify Bob unless the distance between A and B is no more than R In case (c) and (d) where Bob is also camouflaging and has exposed the camouflage range R 1 B to the LBS server, the LBS server does not notify Bob unless the distance between A and B is no more than R 2 A + r B + R 1 B . Due to the enlarged range, this will definitely result in more wrong alerts than case (a) and (b). In case (c), Bob is able to identify the wrong alert with k A 11 . In case (d), Bob can identify that Alice is indeed nearby within r B if Bob has all of the access keys of Alice.
Privacy Analysis
Collusion Resistance
We refer collusion as that two LBS users collude with each other in order to obtain the access privilege higher than what they are allowed to have. Under the twodimensional scalable privacy guarantees based on SCP-ABE, collusion may be feasible in two cases.
In the first case, users try to collude for deriving access keys. In this case study, we assume that Bob owns the attributes satisfying the access policy P 11 of Alice, and another user Clark owns the attributes satisfying P 21 \ P 11 . According to SCP-ABE, Bob can only obtain the access key k A 11 , while Clark should not obtain any access keys due to the lack of attributes satisfying P 11 . The goal of their collusion is to obtain k A 21 . However, this is impossible under the CRC model. After separately running the SCP-ABE decryption algorithm, Bob only has e(g, g) r B s and e(g, g) r B p R11 (0) (where r B is the random value selected by AA for Bob), and Clark only has e(g, g) r C p R21 (0) (where r C is the random value selected by AA for Clark). Even if they exchange their computed information, they will not be able to obtain e(g, g) . Details of the analysis on such a collusion resistance can be referred in [25] .
In the second case, users collude for getting more precise camouflage tuple via exchanging their access keys. Now we assume that Bob's attributes satisfy P 21 and Clark's attributes satisfy P 12 . Therefore, Bob has k 
Server Privilege
We have addressed that the LBS server is not able to decrypt any access keys without the SCP-ABE user key corresponding to the required non-LBS attributes. Here we analyze whether the server can obtain them without the required non-LBS attributes.
In order to perform the SCP-ABE decryption algorithm, Bob needs to use SK 1 i . It is then computationally infeasible for the LBS server to derive g r H(attri i )
i , which makes it impossible to obtain SK An B0 . Therefore, the proposed CRC model can guarantee Alice's desired privacy guarantee with respect to the LBS server.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We have shown that LBS users could preserve their privacy and enjoy the service in a wide range of applications under the proposed CRC model. It is also noted that some extra cost is inevitably introduced in this process. In this section, we implement the CRC model and carry out a detailed analysis on the computation cost for both the user side and the server side.
Computation Cost of User Side Operations
User side computation cost mainly comes from two phases, i.e. the location report phase that consists of the camouflage algorithm and the data encryption, as well as the information recovery phase where data decryption and delegation algorithms are involved. We implement the user side algorithms on a Google Nexus 4 (1.5GHz quad-core Snapdragon S4 Pro with Krait CPUs, Android 5.0) and measure the involved computations as follows. Camouflage: The camouflage algorithm only requires lightweight mathematical computations. The process of the proposed camouflage algorithm indicates that the computation cost linearly increases with the number of the PoIs surrounding the candidate camouflaged point, and the number of the candidates for generating a camouflaged point. In the experiment, we fix the number of candidates as six, and the number of PoIs surrounding each candidate as ten. Then we measure the computation time of generating a camouflaged point. By running the camouflage algorithm using ten different inputs, we get Data encryption: Data encryption includes SCP-ABE encryption on access keys, and symmetric encryption on camouflage information. We only measure the computation cost involved by SCP-ABE encryption since the computation cost of symmetric encryption is much more lightweight than that of SCP-ABE encryption. In particular, two types of relatively heavy computations involved by the SCP-ABE encryption algorithm are pairings and exponentiations 2 on G 0 and G 1 and symmetric encryption on the camouflage information. The computation time of encrypting a message linearly increases with the number of attributes. By fixing the message length as 64 bytes, we run the SCP-ABE encryption algorithm ten times and obtain the average computation time as 60ms per attribute. Data decryption: For the same reason mentioned above, we only measure the cost of SCP-ABE decryption algorithm, which contains two parts of computations, i.e. pairings and multiplications on G 1 . As in the encryption cost measurement, we only measure the cost of the first part, which has approximate linearity with respects to the number of attributes. The average computation time is 48ms per ten attributes. Delegation: This algorithm involves in exponentiations and multiplications on G 0 and G 1 . The computation time also linearly increases with the number of attributes. The measured average time is 75ms per attribute. Fig.  8 shows a summary of the average computation time of the above mentioned operations.
Computation Cost of Server Side Operations
The LBS server side computation cost comes from delegation. The AA side computation cost comes from user key generation. Both of the two algorithms involve in exponentiations and multiplications on G 0 and G 1 . Since the user key generation and the delegation in the SCP-ABE algorithm is the same as in CP-ABE algorithm. We measure the cost based on the benchmark of CP-ABE algorithm [27] . As provided in [27] , the computation time of user key generation is about 30ms per attribute on workstation with 64-bit 3.2 Ghz Pentium 4 processor. 2 . As in [27] , operations are conducted using a 160-bit elliptic curve group based on the curve y 2 = x 3 + x over 512-bit finite field. Besides, the computation time of delegation is almost the same due to similar computation operations.
Summary
Under the case study conducted in Section 5, we suppose that S n A and S l A contain the same number of attributes. Then we measure the computation cost on the side of Alice, Bob, the AA, and the LBS server with various number of N attributes. Alice, who is camouflaging and hence performs the camouflage algorithm as well as data encryption, spends 15ms + N × 60ms in the service. Bob, who is requesting Alice's location, needs to perform delegation and decryption. In particular, the delegation time is at most 2×(N/2)×75ms since S 2 ∈ S l A , while the decryption time is (N/10) × 48ms. Additionally, the AA will spend N × 30ms assigning the user key for Alice. The LBS server will spend at most (N/2) × 30ms for delegating SK AL B to Bob. By selecting N from 10 to 20, we evaluate the computation time on each communication party's side in Fig.9 . The results show that running the nearby friend notification service in the CRC model costs around 1 seconds on the mobile side, which is at the same level of the average response time of general mobile applications [28] . Therefore, we conclude that the proposed CRC model could be efficiently applied on the mobile side, which is extremely important for privacy-aware LBSs.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we present a Computationally Recoverable Camouflage (CRC) model, through which LBS users can preserve their privacy while requesting services from LBS servers by reporting the camouflaged locations that have the same precision as the real locations. The users are able to recover the desired results in different LBS applications by flexibly leveraging between the service quality and the achieved privacy. The proposed CRC model is able to handle privacy protection for various applications, which conforms to the high diversity of LBSs. In particular, the camouflaged point generation is based on a novel camouflage algorithm considering both location context and social context. The camouflage algorithm not only provides formal privacy guarantee for LBS users, but also enables the possibility for LBS users to leverage between the service quality and the achieved privacy. Furthermore, we introduce the SCP-ABE algorithm and adapt it in the CRC model to control the access to two-dimensional scalable camouflage information. Additionally, we show that the CRC model can be efficiently applied in LBSs through cost evaluation on both user side and server side. In particular, the nearby friend notification service just costs around one second on the mobile user side.
Future work should aim at developing strategies to deal with the power efficiency issue of the CRC model on mobile devices. This is because every time when a LBS user moves to a new place, the individual needs to run camouflage algorithm to generate new camouflage tuples and to encrypt them under SCP-ABE. Such a process may consume substantial power when the user moves frequently. We also aim at integrating the proposed CRC model into real LBS system, and providing a performance benchmark for multiple typical LBS applications.
